Abstract
The Indian scholarship has yet to confront a foundational legal paradox arising from the commercialisation of the biometric data as training inputs for an artificial intelligence system. India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, classifies biometric data- fingerprints, facial geometry, voiceprints and emotional response markers as personal data and the framework for the same is built entirely on the logic of privacy and hence imposes content-based obligations on fiduciaries processing it. However, the current framework offers no answer to an equally pressing question: who owns biometric data against commercial extraction?
This paper examines the existing Indian intellectual property law and its capacity to treat biometric data as protectable subject matter. This paper aims to address three doctrinal possibilities: whether section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957, can include the biometric data under the originality threshold, given that it is generated by a biological process rather than creative authorship; secondly, where a compilation or dataset of biometric information can qualify for database protection as an instrument lacking prominently in Indian law despite its recognition in the European union’s database directive and lastly whether Indian judicial reasoning in ICC development v. Arvee enterprises and the Shivaji Rao Gaikwad line can extend the personality rights to confer a proprietary interest in one’s biometric identity.
This paper further argues for the inadequacy of the frameworks, be they individual or collective, in addressing the structural legal gap, and analyses the assumption of IP law that protectable subject matter is produced rather than inhabited. The central theme of this paper is based on a comparative analysis of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act and the EU AI Act’s high-risk data obligations while proposing a sui generis protection model that will serve in bridging the DPDP Act consent mechanisms with a transferrable economic right in biometric data, concluding with a doctrinal path towards accommodating the recognition of self as a source of intellectual property and not merely a subject matter of privacy.
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